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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all leasing transactions, whether residential or commercial,
involve a payment of a lump sum by the Tenant to the Lessor before
the tenancy begins. Most of the time, the Lessor's position is expressed
in the general thought: "I want some money up front." This general
thought is typically the product of one or more of the following motiva-
tions or purposes for a front end payment:
1. Consideration for something given or to be given by the Lessor.
2. Security for the Tenant's future performance.
3. Induce performance and deter breach (the "be a good scout" mo-
tive).
At first glance, dealing with front end payments may appear to be as
easy as pouring sand out of a boot with instructions on the heel. How-
ever, there are several ways in which the front end payment can be
structured, and the ramifications of the particular choice can have a
significant impact on the parties. Sometimes the choice is made with-
out an appreciation of the distinctions. Other times, even if the distinc-
tions are recognized, the effect of the choice may be unclear or have a
deceptive appearance of clarity.
The purpose of this article is to categorize the various types of front
end payments in California, analyze their ramifications, identify prob-
lem areas and propose solutions. The scope includes all Lessor/Tenant
relationships, whether commercial or residential, and whether fixed
term or month to month.
II. TYPES OF FRONT END PAYMENTS
The three principal types of front end payments are: (1) advance
payment of rent; (2) bonus or consideration for execution of lease; and
(3) security deposit. Two other common types also fall in the general
category of front end payments: (1) liquidated damages; and (2) option
payment.
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An advance payment of rent is a prepayment of rent for a future per-
iod. Although rent for the first month is typically prepaid at the time
the lease is executed, and rent for successive months is due in advance,
the advance payments of rent dealt with in this article refer only to
prepayments for the last one or more months of the term.
A bonus or considerationfor execution of lease is ostensibly a pay-
ment to the Lessor in exchange for his entering into the lease. This
should be distinguished from an option payment, mentioned below.
A security deposit is a sum put in the Lessor's hands to hold for use in
the event the Tenant defaults in performing his obligations under the
tenancy, such as failure to pay rent, failure to clean or causing damages
to the premises.
A liquidated damage deposit is a variation of the security deposit.
The parties provide that a specific amount (or an amount determinable
by a specific formula) is the agreed amount of damages in the event of
particular breaches by the Tenant.
An option payment is the consideration given by a prospective Ten-
ant to a prospective Lessor for an option to lease in the future on cer-
tain agreed terms. It can also be consideration for an option to
terminate the lease and be excused from further obligations.
III. REFUND OF OR OFFSET AGAINST FRONT END PAYMENTS
A question that frequently arises between the disillusioned parties to
a delicate relationship gone sour is: Can the Lessor keep the front end
payment even though it exceeds actual damages suffered by, or
amounts due to, the Lessor? There is also a related question: Can the
Tenant offset the front end payment against damages or amounts due
to the Lessor?
For example, suppose:
Front End Payment $1,000
Delinquent Rent and Damages $ 700
$ 300
Can the Lessor keep the $300 or must it be refunded?
Can the Tenant offset $700 of the front end payment against the de-
linquent rent and damages, or can the Lessor keep the $1,000 and sue
for an additional $700?
The simple answer to these questions is: It depends!
Although legislation dealing with the problem is now on the books,
there are sufficient gaps and ambiguities to provide for some suspense
and research. In order to understand which front end payments the
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statutes cover and how to deal with those payments not covered, it is
helpful to review the California case law that preceded the statutes.
Following that, there will be a review of the original statute enacted in
1970 and the statutory changes enacted in 1977. Statutory and case law
dealing with liquidated damages will be treated separately.
A. Case Law Absent Statute Application
Prior to the enactment of Civil Code section 1950.51 in 1970 and the
amendment of that section z and addition of Civil Code section 1950.73
in 1977, the California courts developed rules that based the availabil-
ity of refund of a front end payment and the use of such a payment to
offset amounts due the Lessor on the type of front end payment in-
volved. A distinction based on labels creates a situation in which it
does not matter what you pay (or receive) as long as you pronounce it
correctly.
1. Security Deposit
If a payment is determined to be a security deposit, it is to be
credited toward amounts due the Lessor and any excess must be re-
funded to the Tenant.4 The purpose of such a payment is to provide
the Lessor with a fund as security for the Tenant's performance and it
can be used only to cover delinquent rents or other amounts due or
damages owed to the Lessor.
2. Liquidated Damages-Background
Attempts by Lessors to sweeten their positions by inserting provi-
sions allowing them to keep the entire deposit if the Tenant breaches,
without considering the actual amount of damages, have consistently
turned sour. The courts have declared such provisions to be void as a
penalty and an attempt to fix damages in anticipation of breach in vio-
l. Act of Sept. 17, 1970, ch. 1317, § 1, 1970 Stat. 2452 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1950.5 (West Supp. 1978)) (note that statute was originally misnumbered § 1951).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5 (West Supp. 1978).
3. Id. § 1950.7.
4. Although "string citations" in law review articles are frowned upon, the brow must
suffer a few such furrows in this article. One of the purposes of section II1A. is to provide
practitioners with a single source of significant cases dealing with the topic footnoted. Red-
mon v. Graham, 211 Cal. 491, 295 P. 1031 (1931); Boral v. Caldwell, 223 Cal. App. 2d 157,
35 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963); Warming v. Shapiro, 118 Cal. App. 2d 72, 257 P.2d 74 (1953);
Garfinkle v. Montgomery, 113 Cal. App. 2d 149, 248 P.2d 52 (1952); Ace Realty Co. v.
Friedman, 106 Cal. App. 2d 805, 236 P.2d 174 (1951); Thompson v. Swiryn, 95 Cal. App. 2d
619, 213 P.2d 740 (1950).
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lation of former Civil Code section 1670.1 The major requirement for
valid liquidated damages, set forth in Civil Code section 1671, has been
that "from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable or ex-
tremely difficult to fix the actual damage."6 Most cases have held that
this. requirement has not been met.
Since the deposit is in essence a security deposit, the Lessor can gen-
erally still apply it to actual amounts due to him, even though the for-
feiture provision is void-ie., no bonus, but no loss. However, the case
of Green v. Frahm' presents a potential trap for the Lessor who puts all
his eggs in the liquidated damage basket. In that case the Tenant made
a front end payment of $3,000, under a lease which provided that it was
to be retained by the Lessor as a "guarantee" that the Tenant would
pay his rent and perform the lease covenants. If the Tenant defaulted,
the $3,000 was to be "forfeited" to Lessor. If the Tenant performed, the
payment would bear interest and be returned to Tenant at the end of
the term or upon premature termination without fault of the Tenant.
The lease was terminated for rent default. In an unlawful detainer ac-
tion, the Lessor recovered possession and a judgment for $500 rent.
The former Tenant then assigned his claim to the $3,000 to Green. In
the action by Green against the Lessor, the court held the provision for
forfeiture to be void as a penalty and in violation of Civil Code section
1670. The court concluded that since the Lessor had taken the position
that the whole sum had been forfeited and did not ask that a portion of
the deposit be applied to the delinquent rent, plaintiff was entitled to
recover the entire $3,000. The Lessor's conduct was deemed to be a
repudiation of the security deposit and a waiver of his right to retain
any portion for the rent due. This left the Lessor to attempt to collect
the delinquent rent judgment from his former Tenant.
Although the early cases seem to shut the door on valid liquidated
damage provisions in leases, there are certain types of damages flowing
from a Tenant's breach that should now be subject to valid liquidation.
This conclusion is based on three factors: (1) the repeal of Civil Code
5. Civil Code of 1872, § 1670 (current version at CAL. Civ. CODE § 1671(d) (West Supp.
1978)). See Redmon v. Graham, 211 Cal. 491,295 P. 1031 (1931); Knight v. Marks, 183 Cal.
354, 191 P. 531 (1920); Green v. Frahm, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917); Jack v. Sinsheimer,
125 Cal. 563, 58 P. 130 (1899); Parish v. Studebaker, 50 Cal. App. 719, 195 P. 721 (1920); Rez
v. Summers, 34 Cal. App. 527, 168 P. 156 (1917).
6. Civil Code of 1872, § 1670 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (West Supp.
1978)) (note that amendment became operative July 1, 1978).
7. Knight v. Marks, 183 Cal. 354, 191 P. 531 (1920); Jack v. Sinsheimer, 125 Cal. 563, 58
P. 130 (1899); Parish v. Studebaker, 50 Cal. App. 719, 195 P. 721 (1920); Rez v. Summers, 34
Cal. App. 527, 168 P. 156 (1917).
8. Green v. Frahm, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917).
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section 1670 and the amendment of Civil Code section 1671, operative
July 1, 1978; (2) the range of Lessor remedies and damages provided in
Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4, 9 operative July 1, 1971; and (3)
the facts of the cases that produced the broad statements of invalidity
of liquidated damages in leases. The availability of liquidated dam-
ages will be given separate treatment below.
3. Advance Payment of Rent, Bonus or Consideration for
Execution
Now the good news for the Lessor. As long as the front end payment
is clearly given as an advance payment of rent or as a bonus or consid-
eration for Lessor's execution of the lease, the cases have consistently
held that the Lessor may keep the entire payment. Also, it need not be
offset against amounts due to the Lessor from the Tenant.' 0 These pay-
ments have been treated as belonging absolutely to the Lessor from the
moment of payment, with title to the fund passing immediately upon
payment.
Although with respect to an advance payment of rent, this result
might be thought to be an application of the common law rule that rent
for a certain period accrues on its due date and is not apportionable on
the basis of time, 1 this is only partially true. The right to retain ap-
pears to depend upon actual payment to the Lessor, not merely upon
accrual of the due date. For example, in Respini v. Porta'2 a quarterly
advance payment of rent had accrued but had not yet been paid when
the Tenant defaulted. The court held that Lessor was entitled to re-
cover only his damages, not the full amount of the rent.
9. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1951.2, 1951.4 (West Supp. 1978).
10. Harvey v. Weisbaum, 159 Cal. 265, 113 P. 656 (1911); Warming v. Shapiro, 118 Cal.
App. 2d 72, 257 P.2d 74 (1953); Ace Realty Co. v. Friedman, 106 Cal. App. 2d 805, 236 P.2d
174 (1951); Parigian v. Citizens Nat'1 Trust & Say. Bank, 42 Cal. App. 2d 773, 110 P.2d 117
(1941); Grand Cent. Pub. Mkt. v. Kojima, 11 Cal. App. 2d 712, 54 P.2d 786 (1936); A-I
Garage v. Lange Inv. Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 593,44 P.2d 681 (1935); Weinreich v. Vernon, 109
Cal. App. 60, 292 P. 651 (1930); Wood v. Hipwell, 107 Cal. App. 680, 290 P. 1040 (1930);
Foye v. Simpkinson, 89 Cal. App. 119, 264 P. 331 (1928); Gordon v. Harris, 94 Cal. App.
682, 271 P. 779 (1928); Pigg v. Kelley, 92 Cal. App. 329, 268 P. 463 (1928); McArthur v.
Kluck, 75 Cal. App. 785, 243 P. 453 (1925); Wetzler v. Patterson, 73 Cal. App. 527, 238 P.
1077 (1925); Anderson v. Julius Levin Co., 71 Cal. App. 73, 234 P. 442 (1925); Curtis v.
Arnold, 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 P. 510 (1919); Ramish v. Workman, 33 Cal. App. 19, 164 P. 26
(1917).
11. Fahrenbaker v. E. Clemens Horst Co., 209 Cal. 7, 284 P. 905 (1930); Friedman v.
Isenbruck, 111 Cal. App. 2d 326, 244 P.2d 718 (1952).
12. 89 Cal. 464, 26 P. 967 (1891).
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a. No Fault Termination
When the leasing relationship is terminated due to the Tenant's de-
fault, the Tenant might be consoled a bit by the realization that it was
his own fault that he is out the money. But if the lease is terminated
prematurely without fault he still recovers nothing and has no such
consolation. 3 In Harvey v. Weisbaum,'4 the Tenant made an advance
payment of rent of $2,700 for the first year of a two-year lease. After
about a month and a half, the premises were destroyed by a fire follow-
ing an earthquake and the lease terminated. The Tenant was denied a
refund for the portion of the rent attributable to the balance of the year.
The court said the payment was final and absolute. It also noted that
the destruction was unforeseen and due to no fault of either party.
Thus, the court concluded each party must suffer, and since they were
equally innocent, the law should not interfere to aid a Tenant who has
not taken the precaution to provide for the contingency in the lease.,
This seems to be tough medicine for a Tenant who paid for some-
thing he did not get, through no fault of his own. Maybe he did not
provide for the "contingency" because he believed he would not have
to pay for what he did not receive-a trap for the naive draftsman. The
court said that the consideration for the rent paid in advance was not
only the use of the premises for the future months, but also the convey-
ance to the Tenant by the lease and his obtaining possession of the
premises. However, it does not appear from the case that the parties
provided in the lease that this was the consideration for the advance
payment. The parties dealt with the payment as a prepayment of rent
for use of the premises for twelve months of the two-year term, and the
Tenant received only one and a half months of that period. Although
the court talked of the lease as a conveyance for which consideration
had been paid, a lease is also an ongoing contractual relationship in
which the Tenant pays for certain periods of possession to be given by
the Lessor.
15
It is pointed out in Harvey that the common law rule that destruction
does not relieve the Tenant from paying rent is based on an equitable
division of the loss, and a fear that the Tenant would be less careful if
freed from the lease upon destruction (but keep in mind the fire here
was caused by an earthquake, not by Tenant's lack of care). At com-
mon law, the impact of this rule on the Tenant could be ameliorated in
13. C.M. Staub Shoe Co. v. Byrne, 169 Cal. 122, 145 P. 1032 (1915); Harvey v. Weisbaum,
159 Cal. 265, 113 P. 656 (1911).
14. 159 Cal. 265, 113 P. 656 (1911).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1925 (West 1954).
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many cases where the Tenant could still put the land to some produc-
tive use for the balance of the term, because the destruction did not
terminate the lease. But even this possibility is foreclosed by a termina-
tion pursuant to a lease provision or statute. California has modified
the common law rule by statutes which provide for termination of a
lease upon partial or total destruction, relieving a Tenant of future rent
payments.1 6 However, the statutes do not mention relief from an ad-
vance payment of rent for the future period that the Tenant does not
receive.
In the absence of careful drafting, the Tenant is in a peculiar posi-
tion. Suppose a one-year lease is entered into and the premises are
destroyed resulting in termination of the lease after six months. If the
rent is unpaid for the final six months, it is excused. However, if the
rent has been prepaid for the final six months, there is no refund. Re-
garding the common law rule that rent for a period accrues entirely on
its due date and is not apportioned on the basis of time, California has
modified the rule by statute 7 to protect the Lessor, but not the Tenant.
Thus, if the rent was due at the end of a period and the lease termi-
nated before the due date, the Lessor could recover the portion of the
rent attributable to the pre-termination period. But if the rent was pre-
paid for a period after termination, the Tenant could not get a refund.
The Tenant must obtain protection by drafting for a refund of
unearned rent.
If a lease is terminated by mutual consent, rather than by some
event, the same result occurs."'
b. Lessor Fault Termination
A ray of sunshine brightens the Tenant's path if the lease termination
is caused by the Lessor's default. In this situation, an advance payment
of rent, bonus or consideration for execution is recoverable by the Ten-
ant.19 The courts discuss the right of recovery in terms of failure of
consideration and unjust enrichment.
An interesting twist on the Tenant's recovery is presented in Butt v.
Bertola.20 The monthly rent was $100. The Tenant made a front end
payment of $600 and the lease referred to it as an absolute payment as
16. Id. §§ 1932(2), 1933(4).
17. Id. § 1935.
18. Foye v. Simpkinson, 89 Cal. App. 119, 264 P. 331 (1928).
19. Friedman v. Isenbruck, 111 Cal. App. 2d 326, 244 P.2d 718 (1952); Butt v. Bertola, 110
Cal App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952); Johnson v. Snyder, 99 Cal. App. 2d 86, 221 P.2d 164
(1950); Graham v. Wood, 8 Cal. App. 2d 451, 48 P.2d 124 (1935).
20. 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952).
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consideration for making the lease. The lease provided that if the Ten-
ant faithfully performed, he was to have "free rent" for the last six
months of the lease. The lease was prematurely terminated by the Les-
sor's breach. The court said that since the Lessor deprived the Tenant
of the value of the six months' free rent, the Tenant could recover that
value as an item of damages. Further, the amount of damages might
be more or less than the stipulated rent of $100 per month. Thus, in
this type of a situation, if there is a rising market in rental values, the
Tenant may be able to recover even more than he paid to the Lessor by
framing his recovery as damages rather than a refund.
c. Construction and Drafting Problems-Tenant's Cases
Is it really a security deposit, subject to refund and offset, despite
language of advance payment of rent, bonus or consideration? There
are several cases dealing with this question, some with the Tenant win-
ning (discussed in this subsection) and some with the Lessor winning
(discussed in the next subsection). While their results are not always
clearly reconcilable on the facts, there is a consistent theme. An abso-
lute and unconditional payment indicates an advance payment of rent,
bonus or consideration for execution. If the Tenant retains some inter-
est in the payment, it indicates a security deposit. The choice and con-
sistency of words is crucial.
In Rez v. Summers,2 the Tenant made an $800 front end payment
and the Lessor executed a receipt stating that it was "full payment for
the rent of said premises for the last two months." Standing alone, this
clearly indicates an advance payment of rent. However, the lease also
provided that in the event that the building could not be restored
within sixty days after a destruction, "the security of eight hundred dol-
lars is to be returned to the lessee by the lessor." The court said the
payment was not absolute and unconditional because the money would
be returned to the Tenant pursuant to the destruction contingency. In
addition, the payment was referred to as "security."
In Parish v. Studebaker,22 the lease recited that Tenant had paid
$1,600 as rent for the last two months. The lease also provided that the
sum would bear interest for the Tenant's benefit and that, if the lease
was terminated or forfeited, the money "should become" the property
of the Lessor, without affecting her right to damages. In effect, the
court treated the payment as not being an absolute payment to Lessor
21. 34 Cal. App. 527, 168 P. 156 (1917).
22. 50 Cal. App. 719, 195 P. 721 (1920).
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upon receipt, but rather as the Tenant's money being held by the Les-
sor to be applied in the future for use of the premises. The court con-
cluded that since the Tenant's right to future possession was lost, the
retention by the Lessor of the payments without offset against amounts
due him would be an invalid forfeiture. Accordingly, the payment was
offset against the Lessor's judgment for rent and damages. Although
the recital of receipt of the payment for the last two months' rent
clearly indicated an advance payment of rent, the court apparently felt
that it was not an absolute and unconditional payment to the Lessor,
and that the Tenant retained an interest in the funds, because of the
provision for interest and the provision that upon termination the
money "should become" the property of the Lessor. If it were an ad-
vance payment of rent, it would not become the property of the Lessor
in the future because it would already be his upon payment. Also, if it
were the property of the Lessor, it would not bear interest for the Ten-
ant.
In Redmon v. Graham,'3 the lease referred to a $5,400 payment as
security for performance of the Tenant, and provided that upon the
Tenant's breach the Lessor would have the right to keep it as "liqui-
dated damages." The Lessor unsuccessfully argued that it should be
considered an advance payment of rent because of a provision that it
would be applied as payment of the last three months' rent if the Ten-
ant performed. This was clearly a security deposit, and the provision
concerning the last three months did not change it to an immediate
advance payment of rent. It was just a provision for the future applica-
tion of the Tenant's security deposit to rent. Although the court's con-
clusion really needed no further support, the court commented that its
interpretation was strengthened by a provision that the $5,400 would be
returned upon accidental destruction. This was said to be "wholly in-
consistent with the idea of an absolute payment in advance, with title to
the money passing to the lessor."'-4 The court then held the provision
for retention as liquidated damages to be a void penalty in violation of
Civil Code section 1670. The problem of liquidated damages will be
discussed in detail later.
In Walter H Sullivan, Inc. v. Johnson,5 the lease provided that
$2,500 was paid to the Lessor in consideration of his leasing to the Ten-
ant. Standing alone, this would be an absolute payment as considera-
tion, but the lease further provided that if the Tenant performed, the
23. 211 Cal. 491, 295 P. 1031 (1931).
24. Id. at 494, 295 P. at 1032.
25. 116 Cal. App. 591, 3 P.2d 72 (1931).
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Lessor would pay interest on the $2,500 and credit the payment- on the
last five months' rent. The court treated the payment as a deposit to
secure performance. It was not an absolute payment of consideration
because of the provision for interest and the provision for credit against
the last five months' rent. Nor was it an absolute advance payment of
rent. Rather, it merely provided that it would be credited in the future
for those months if the Tenant performed.
In Bacciocco v. Curtis,26 the lease recited that "as a bonus for the
lessor's execution of this lease, the lessee paid him, unconditionally
upon execution thereof, the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00)."
Standing alone, this would be an absolute and unconditional payment
of a bonus. But the fatal seeds of security deposit were sown with pro-
visions that if the Tenant faithfully performed, Lessor would allow in-
terest on the $5,000, credit it on the last five months' rent, and refund it
if the lease were terminated by destruction. In addition, the Lessor gave
a receipt which referred to the $5,000 as security for the payment of
rent. In upholding the trial court's finding of a security deposit, the
court said the lease provisions were not easily reconcilable with the
idea of an absolute transfer to the Lessor of funds in which the Tenant
retained no further rights. Instead, the provisions suggested that the
Tenant retained substantial rights in the fund until the end of the term.
In Thompson v. Swiryn,27 the lease provided that the Lessor leased to
the Tenant in consideration of $9,000 (only $6,000 was actually paid),
and that the $9,000 paid upon execution was not part of the rental.
These provisions, standing alone, are clearly indicative of consideration
for execution. The ten-year lease also provided for rent of $900 per
month for the first 110 months, and $1.00 per month for the next ten
months. When the Tenant sought a refund, less accrued rent, a de-
struction clause proved fatal to the Lessor's attempt to retain the pay-
ment without offset. This clause provided that if the Lessor elected not
to restore the building after its destruction, he could terminate the lease
by repayment of the fund to the Lessee, less moneys accrued to Lessor
at the date of destruction. The court said it was impossible to reconcile
this provision with the Lessor's contention that the money was paid as a
bonus or consideration. Also, there was evidence that in the lease ne-
gotiations the payment was referred to as "security of good faith" and a
"deposit" and the court said it was apparent that the payment was re-
garded as a deposit for security of performance, and not as considera-
tion for the lease.
26. 12 Cal. 2d 109, 82 P.2d 385 (1938).
27. 95 Cal. App. 2d 619, 213 P.2d 740 (1950).
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In Gaqfnkle v. Monigomery,28 the lease provided for payment of
$1,350 upon execution, as partial security, and for payment of another
$1,350 at a later date. This was clearly a security deposit, and a provi-
sion that the $2,700 would be applied to the rent for the final six
months did not make it an advance payment of rent.
In Dicker v. West,29 the facts demonstrate the problems of structur-
ing an advance payment of rent when the rental is based on a percent-
age of the Tenant's receipts or some other variable keyed to the
Tenant's use of the premises. The case involved the lease of a lumber
mill for approximately two years, and the rent was based on $3.00 per
thousand board feet of lumber cut by the Tenant at the mill. The lease
provided for a "deposit" of $10,000 which "shall apply on the rental."
When the lumber cut accumulated $5,000 in rent, the Tenant was to
"deposit" another $5,000 so that the Lessor would have a "deposit" of
$10,000 "in advance on account of the rental due" on the mill. The
lease terminated prematurely when a fire destroyed the mill. The Les-
sor's contention that he could retain the payment as an advance pay-
ment of rent was rejected. The court held that it was a fund deposited
as security, out of which the rent was to be paid as it accrued. The lease
also contained a provision for a minimum production that would guar-
antee a minimum rental. It obligated the Tenant to cut not less than
250,000 board feet per week during the logging season and, upon fail-
ure to do so, the Tenant was to pay the Lessor the difference at $3.00
per thousand board feet. The court said this clause did not militate
against its conclusion because it was merely to assure prompt perform-
ance, and the destruction of the mill made it impossible to comply.
Does Dicker preclude a true advance payment of rent in percentage
or production rent type leases in general? It does not if the clause is
structured properly. In Dicker, the Lessor obviously had a certain min-
imum amount of rent in mind when he put in the clause for minimum
production. Suppose he had set up the transaction with a minimum
rent of $10,000, to be paid to the Lessor absolutely and unconditionally
upon execution, with additional rent at the rate of $3.00 per thousand
board feet for lumber cut in excess of 3,333,000 board feet ($9,999). A
compulsory operation clause could be included to protect the Lessor's
expectancy of additional rent. It would seem that in any percentage or
production based rent lease, if a minimum rent is established and paid
in whole or part in advance, the payment can be drafted into an abso-
lute and unconditional advance payment of rent. The Lessor's problem
28. 113 Cal. App. 2d 149, 248 P.2d 52 (1952).
29. 164 Cal. App. 2d 55, 330 P.2d 106 (1958).
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in the Dicker case was that the payment was set up as a fund to be
applied in the future to rent as the lumber was cut.
In Boral v. Caldwell,3" the Tenant of a two-year lease agreed to pay a
total of $24,000 in installments, paying $3,000 upon execution of the
lease and the remaining $21,000 at a rate of $1,000 per month for the
second through the twenty-second months of the lease. The lease pro-
vided that if the Tenant was not in default at the end of the twenty-
second month, he would be entitled to remain for an additional two
months without payment of rent. Economically, it seems that the front
end payment of $3,000 was payment of the first month's rent ($1,000)
and an advance payment of rent for the last two months ($2,000). The
court said that the lease was not unambiguous. Although the word "se-
curity" was not used in the lease, the Lessor, in testimony concerning
negotiations with other parties regarding a lease of the premises, had
adopted the characterization by the Tenant's attorney of "security" in
reference to a front end payment. The court held that the trial court's
interpretation as a security deposit was not unreasonable.
The foregoing cases are examples showing that a Lessor's attempt to
set up an advance payment of rent, bonus or consideration for execu-
tion, can be undermined by lease provisions, or comments made during
negotiations or at trial, that indicate that the Tenant retained an inter-
est in the payment, and that it was not an absolute and unconditional
payment. The significant factors in these cases causing the courts to
conclude that the payments more closely resembled security deposits
than advance payments of rent or bonuses or consideration for execu-
tion can be summarized as follows:
1. Provision for refund upon destruction.
2. Provision for future application to rent.
3. Provision for interest for the benefit of the Tenant.
4. Reference to the payment as "security" or a "deposit" in the
lease, a receipt, negotiations, or testimony.
5. Provision for future forfeiture, indicating a continuing interest
of Tenant to be forfeited.
d Construction and Drafting Problems-Lessor's Cases
Lest the Tenant become too flush with optimism when any of the
factors mentioned above is involved, Lessors have also had some
significant victories in the construction arena.
There are cases in which a provision for refund upon premature ter-
mination, such as by destruction, did not knock out the Lessor's reten-
30. 223 CaL App. 2d 157, 35 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA4W REVIEW
tion of the front end payment. In Curtis v. Arnold,3' the lease provided
that "for and in consideration" of $3,000 paid by the Tenant, the Lessor
entered into the lease. If the lease terminated before the end of the ten-
year term for any cause except Tenant's breach, the Lessor was to pay
the Tenant $3,000 with interest. Also, the last five months of the term
were to be "free of rent" if the Tenant fully performed. The court con-
cluded that upon default termination the Tenant was not entitled to
recover any portion of the $3,000. Title to the consideration for the
Lessor's making the lease passed to the Lessor when paid. The court
pointed out that even if the payment were regarded as an advance pay-
ment of rent, the Lessor was entitled to retain it (if the rent rate had
been continued for the last five "free" months, it would have been
$4,625, which is approximately the same as the $3,000 with interest for
the ten-year term at the rate in the lease). Note that the court reached
its conclusion despite provisions for refund and interest, and the eco-
nomic effect of a credit on the last five months' rent.
In Wood v. H#pwell,3 z a sublease provided that $1,000 had been paid
as "consideration for the making of this lease." The court treated the
payment as consideration despite a provision for refund upon termina-
tion due to fife, or other casualty, and a provision that economically
amounted to a credit on the rent for the last two months of the term.
In Grand Central Public Market v. Kojima,33 front end payments
were referred to as consideration for the Lessor's execution of leases. A
provision for refund if the Lessor did not restore after destruction and a
provision for credit on the last two months' rent, did not prevent the
payment from being treated as an absolute payment to the Lessor. Ti-
tle to the money was treated as passing to the Lessor when the leases
were executed.
There are cases where the front end payments were to be credited on
rent for the final months if the Tenant faithfully performed, yet the
court treated the payments as belonging absolutely to the Lessor when
paid. These cases involved either express provisions for credit or provi-
sions for "free" rent where the economic realities amounted to a credit.
The Curtis, Wood, and Grand Central cases mentioned immediately
above involve this factor. Several other cases also deal with this issue.
For example, in Ramish v. Workman,34 a payment of $7,200 "as a fur-
ther consideration for this lease in addition to the rent" was treated as
31. 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 P. 510 (1919).
32. 107 Cal. App. 680, 290 P. 1040 (1930).
33. 11 Cal. App. 2d 712, 54 P.2d 786 (1936).
34. 33 Cal. App. 19, 164 P. 26 (1917).
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clearly a bonus or consideration. A provision that it would be credited
on the rent for the last four months and eighteen days was said to fur-
nish no basis for a contention that the payment should be construed as
a security deposit. The title to the payment passed absolutely to the
Lessor unaffected by the credit provision.35 In A-1 Garage v. Lange
Investment Co.,36 the court said that although a provision for refund by
rent credits was an item to consider in interpreting a doubtful lease, it
was not inconsistent with the expressed intent of the parties that the
payment was a consideration for execution of the lease.
A provision for application of the payment to the payment of rent
was combined with a provision for interest, and a reference to the pay-
ment as "security" in Gordon v. Harris.37 This case involved a contract
between a contractor and owner for the construction of a building, and
a lease by the owner as Lessor to the contractor as Tenant. Instead of a
front end payment passing hands from Tenant to Lessor, the lease pro-
vided that $5,000 of the construction contract price was to be left un-
paid to the contractor-Tenant "as security that the said contractor, the
lessee in the lease herein, shall faithfully and substantially comply"
with the lease. The lease also provided that the $5,000 together with
interest, "shall be applied" in payment of rent for the last nine months
and a portion of the tenth month of the term. The court emphasized
that the positive and mandatory statement that the $5,000 plus interest
"shall" be applied in payment of the rent left nothing to be applied as
security for any other payments. Thus, it was held to be an advance
payment of rent, not a security deposit.
A provision for future forfeiture of the payment, which arguably in-
dicates that the Tenant has a continuing interest in the fund until it is
forfeited, has been treated as not preventing an immediate and absolute
payment to the Lessor. Pigg v. Kelley"8 and Wetzler v. Patterson9 in-
volved payments designated as advance payments of rent, with provi-
sions that the amounts were to be forfeited to the Lessors or retained by
the Lessors as a forfeiture. In both cases the courts reasoned that an
advance payment of rent belonged to the Lessor from the moment of
receipt and was not subject to refund anyway, so the forfeiture provi-
35. Cases to the same effect are Warming v. Shapiro, 118 Cal. App. 2d 72, 257 P.2d 74
(1953); Ace Realty Co. v. Friedman, 106 Cal. App. 2d 805, 236 P.2d 174 (1951); A-1 Garage
v. Lange Inv. Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 593,44 P.2d 681 (1935); and Anderson v. Julius Levin Co.,
71 Cal. App. 73, 234 P. 442 (1925).
36. 6 Cal. App. 2d 593, 44 P.2d 681 (1935).
37. 94 Cal. App. 682, 271 P. 779 (1928).
38. 92 Cal. App. 329, 268 P. 463 (1928).
39. 73 Cal. App. 527, 238 P. 1077 (1925).
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sion could be ignored. Since the Tenant could not get the payment
back anyway, a provision for forfeiture was just an inartful way of say-
ing what would be the case even without the provision. The WelzIer
court pointed out that if the payment were construed as a security de-
posit, the provision for forfeiture would be an illegal and void penalty
and it is not to be presumed that the parties deliberately entered into an
illegal contract. A similar comment about avoiding an interpretation
that would render a provision void was made in A-1 Garage v. Lange
Investment Co.,' discussed above. However, in Redmon v. Graham,4
also discussed above, the Lessor's argument that an interpretation re-
sulting in legality should be chosen over one which leads to illegality
failed. The court decided that there was no ambiguity, that the pay-
ment was a security deposit, and that the forfeiture provision was void.
The cases in this subsection are examples showing that Lessors' at-
tempts to set up advance payments of rent, bonuses or consideration for
execution may survive despite the presence of one or more of the fac-
tors that proved fatal in the cases in the preceding subsection.
e. Construction and Drafting Problems-Conclusion
Did the parties intend an absolute payment, with title passing to the
Lessor upon payment (ie., an advance payment of rent, bonus or con-
sideration for execution), or did they intend that the Tenant retain an
interest in the fund (ie., a security deposit)? What you see at first
glance or draft is not necessarily what you get. If the payment is la-
beled as an advance payment of rent, bonus or consideration, it may or
may not be treated in substance as a security deposit, depending on the
significance accorded other factors such as:
1. Provision for refund upon destruction.
2. Provision for future application to rent.
3. Reference to the payment as "security" or a "deposit."
4. Provision for interest for the benefit of the Tenant.
5. Provision for future forfeiture.
Unless the lease drafter enjoys the prospect of uncertain litigation,
the lease provisions should be consistent with the idea that the payment
is absolute, with title vested in the Lessor upon payment, or with the
idea that the payment is held by the Lessor while the Tenant retains a
substantial interest. The factors mentioned above are, at the very least,
red flags warning of potential conflict.
40. 6 Cal. App. 2d 593, 44 P.2d 681 (1935).
41. 211 CaL 491, 295 P. 1031 (1931).
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4. Option Payment-To Lease or Terminate
If a person pays the property owner in exchange for an option to
lease the property in the future, the payment belongs to the Lessor.42 It
is consideration for the option and is independent of the mutual rela-
tionships of Lessor and Tenant that may arise between the parties if
and when the option is ,exercised. If it is a true option, the potential
Tenant has paid for and received time and the potential Lessor's obli-
gation to lease. The potential Tenant is free to enter into the lease or
not. If the lease were subsequently entered into and thereafter prema-
turely terminated, either due to the Tenant's fault or a no fault event
such as destruction, the option payment would be retainable without
offset. The payment was for a separate and independent consideration,
and the Tenant received the agreed exchange.
If it is not a true option payment, but rather an attempt to disguise a
payment under the lease itself, the substance and not the label should
prevail. For example, generally an option is the product of a potential
Tenant's desire to have the property tied up while he evaluates the de-
cision to lease or not. Sometimes an option is a compromise solution
when a potential Tenant wants certain contingencies in the lease, such
as obtaining proper zoning, permits, or a franchise, and the potential
Lessor refuses to allow for such contingencies in the lease. The option
gives the potential Tenant the time and opportunity to resolve the con-
tingencies without being bound, while at the same time keeps the prop-
erty on ice if he wants it. If a potential Tenant expresses a desire to
immediately enter into a mutually binding, no-contingency lease, and
the potential Lessor forces an unwanted option in order to get a front
end payment that looks like a retainable option payment, the option
format is a sham.
In addition to an option to get in, there can be an option to get out.
A provision allowing a Lessor to terminate a lease upon payment of an
agreed sum to the Tenant can be upheld as an option payment for the
right to terminate, and not merely an attempt to liquidate damages. 43
Likewise, a payment for the Tenant's right to terminate can be struc-
tured as an option payment. In Kuhlemeler v. Lack" there was a provi-
sion that the $25,000 deposit of the Tenant "is applied" upon the
payment of rent pursuant to a schedule in the lease. There was a clause
42. Welk v. Fainbarg, 255 Cal. App. 2d 269, 63 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1967) (purchase option);
Sheveland v. Reed, 159 Cal. App. 2d 820, 324 P.2d 633 (1958) (purchase option).
43. Western Camps v. Riverway Ranch Enterprises, 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 138 Cal. Rptr.
918 (1977).
44. 50 Cal. App. 2d 802, 123 P.2d 918 (1942).
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which provided that the Tenant could terminate the lease by a thirty-
day notice at any time and be relieved of further duties. It further pro-
vided that upon such termination, Tenant would "forfeit" any interest
he had in the $25,000. The Tenant terminated in accordance with the
clause. The Tenant also claimed termination on the basis of an as-
serted breach by the Lessor, but this issue was decided against the Ten-
ant. The Tenant was unsuccessful in an attempt to recover the balance
of the $25,000, arguing that the retention was a void penalty or forfei-
ture. The court treated the payment as consideration for an option to
terminate. It dealt with the language providing for forfeiture by point-
ing out that the clause, overall, was not an attempt to fix damages for
breach, and it came into effect solely as a result of the Tenant's volun-
tary exercise of the option to terminate the lease. Since "forfeiture"
implies a breach of duty on the part of the one losing his interest, the
court concluded that the parties had misused the term. A forfeiture
conditioned on breach would be void, but that was not the case here.
In addition to the court's discussion of the payment as an option pay-
ment, the court points out that the lease provided the deposit "is" (not
shall be) applied to the rent. This indicates application to rent at the
time of payment, an advance payment of rent which is retainable by
the Lessor, even absent a provision for retention. Preliminary recitals
that the deposit was to guarantee the Tenant's faithful performance
were not considered significant because there was no provision for for-
feiture upon breach.45
Some enterprising drafter will probably try to dress up a true penalty
forfeiture as an option payment. For example, consider a clause that in
effect provides that the Tenant's breach leading to termination shall be
deemed an election by the Tenant to terminate, in which event the Les-
sor can keep the pot as consideration for exercise of the option to termi-
nate. This pot will not hold water because the retention is, in
substance, based on a breach. Kuhlemeier clearly distinguishes this
provision from a true option.
On the other hand, some enterprising Tenant might try to maneuver
a Lessor out of a true option payment after a termination based on
Tenant's breach. The Tenant might argue that since the Tenant did not
exercise his right to terminate the lease, retention of the payment after a
breach termination would be a forfeiture. The success of this maneu-
ver would seem to depend on the wording of the clause. If it provided
that the Lessor could keep the payment only if the option to terminate
45. See also Folden v. Lobrovich, 171 Cal. App. 2d 627, 341 P.2d 368 (1959).
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were exercised, the Tenant would be in good shape because the option
would not have been exercised. This seems to be the way the clause in
Kuhlemeier was worded. However, as noted above, that lease had a
back-up argument for the Lessor, since there was also language of ad-
vance payment of rent. If the clause provided that the payment be-
longed to the Lessor as consideration for the option itself, rather than
consideration for its exercise, the Tenant should not prevail. A pay-
ment for an option is not refundable just because the option has not
been exercised. The optionee has received what he paid for, the option
itself.
5. Summary and Comment
Les says, "I want some money up front." Tess says, "That's o.k. with
me." Where do we go from there? Ideally, Les and Tess will decide
what the money is for, and structure the front end payment accord-
ingly. Practically, Les will probably try to structure the payment so
that he can keep it, without offset, and Tess will probably try to struc-
ture it so that she gets it back to the extent that it exceeds actual dam-
ages and amounts due to Les. Thus, they will maneuver for a category
label that will lead to retention for Les or refund for Tess, respectively.
The effect of the categories, based on the cases and absent applica-
tion of statutory modification, can be summarized as follows:
1. Security Deposit-Refundable to Tenant in excess of damages
and amounts due to Lessor.
2. Liquidated Damages-Likely to be treated as a void penalty or
forfeiture, and thus refundable to Tenant in excess of
damages and amounts due Lessor. But there is recent leg-
islation, discussed below, that may give new life to certain
liquidated damage provisions.
3. Advance Payment of Rent, Bonus or Consideration for
Execution-Retainable by Lessor, without offset for dam-
ages due to Lessor. But there are construction and draft-
ing factors that may lead to treatment as a security deposit.
Also, there is recent legislation, discussed below, that may
require a refund.
4. Option Payment to Enter or Terminate Lease- If a true option
exists, retainable by Lessor without offset for damages or
amounts due to Lessor.
The most fertile ground for disputes has been between the security
deposit on the one side, and the advance payment of rent or bonus or
consideration for execution on the other side. The security deposit is
characterized by the Tenant's retention of a substantial interest in the
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fund. The advance payment of rent, bonus or consideration for excu-
tion, on the other hand, is characterized by an absolute and uncondi-
tional payment to the Lessor, with title to the fund passing to the Lessor
upon receipt. While this is simple in theory, in practice it is like step-
ping from tuft to tuft across a vast morass.
Is the distinction really one with only an illusory difference? In sub-
stance, a Lessor is selling, and a Tenant is buying, time segments of use
of the premises. When the lease prematurely terminates: Tenant only
receives part of the time segments; the Lessor gets paid for the time
segments that were received, together with any damages if the Tenant
breached; and the Lessor still has the remaining time segments to sell to
others or use himself. If the advance payment of rent, bonus or consid-
eration for execution rules are applied, the Tenant also pays, at least in
part, for the time segments which he did not receive, and which were
kept by the Lessor for resale or personal use. This is not like a sale of
goods where part of the order is delivered and something happens to
the rest before delivery, but after title has passed to the buyer. Here the
remaining items, the time segments, are still in the Lessor's hands and
available for his use or disposal. One might argue that in historical
terms a lease is a present conveyance of title to the Tenant of the entire
lease term, including all of its time segments. When the lease is prema-
turely terminated, however, the remaining time segments belong to the
Lessor and he derives the benefit from them.
If a lease terminates, and the Tenant has paid for the time used, but
he has not yet paid for the unused time, a collection by the Lessor, in
excess of damages, would be treated as a penalty or forfeiture. This is
because the Lessor would be extracting something for nothing. But if
the Tenant has already made an advance payment of rent for the un-
used time, the Lessor can keep it. Even if we dress it up in the tradi-
tional explanation of an absolute payment to Lessor, with title passing
upon receipt, is this any less something for nothing? The uneasy feel-
ing that should arise while playing this shell game is expressed by Jus-
tice Moore's concurring opinion in Kuhlemejer v. Lack,46 discussed
above in connection with option payments. In that case, the payment
was treated as an option payment, retainable by the Lessor. Justice
Moore concurred, but he said:
I do so with deep anxiety in view of the precise allocation of the money to
the payment of the rentals for specified months of the term of the lease.
Since those months had not arrived, the moneys were never earned. My
hesitancy arises from a deep-seated dislike for any scheme that transfers
46. 50 Cal. App. 2d 802, 123 P.2d 918 (1942).
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to a person the property of his neighbor without adequate return.47
In that case, the payment was consideration for Tenant's option to ter-
minate and be discharged from further obligations, which the Tenant
exercised, so he did receive something in return. What if there had
been no option and it was just a straight advance payment of rent for
the months following termination?
When the lease terminates through no fault of the Tenant, you can-
not even say, "Tough luck, bad person, you brought it upon yourself."
Even if the Tenant did bring about the termination through default,
California has a strong policy against penalties and forfeitures. In
Freedman v. The Rector,48 a willfully defaulting buyer of real property
was entitled to recover purchase price payments in excess of damages.
Why not a defaulting Tenant, or even a non-defaulting Tenant, who
has paid the purchase price for time segments not received? The court
in Freedman points out that a penalty equal to net benefits conferred
not only fails to take into consideration the degree of culpability, but its
severity increases as the seriousness of the default decreases. This is
just as true in a payment for time segments of a lease not received, as it
is in a payment for a fee title not received.
The problem of something for nothing and the resulting effect of
penalty or forfeiture is more apparent with an advance payment of rent
than with a bonus or consideration for execution. The recipient of the
bonus or consideration for execution can argue that the Tenant did in
fact receive what was paid for, the execution of the lease. This seems to
be based on the common law concept that a lease is a present convey-
ance of an estate to the Tenant. Arguably, the bonus or consideration
is for this conveyance which has taken place upon execution. In most
leases (absent a true option), execution as a separate consideration for
the payment is an illusion worthy of a show at a magic castle.
The illusion of meaningful separate consideration has been rejected
by California courts in a contract for sale of real property. It seems
that in a lease, which California recognizes as a contractual relation-
ship,49 the illusion should not be given any greater substance. In Rodri-
guez v. Barnett,0 a sale contract provided that a deposit made by the
buyers could be retained by the seller as "consideration for the execu-
tion of this agreement." The court said that "[tlhe mere recitation that
the right of the seller to retain this deposit was in consideration for
47. Id. at 809, 123 P.2d at 922.
48. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
49. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1925 (West 1970).
50. 52 Cal. 2d 154, 338 P.2d 907 (1959).
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executing this agreement, is insufficient to establish meaningful sepa-
rate consideration." 51
In Caplan v. Schroeder,5" the buyers gave the sellers a $15,000 note
outside escrow. The contract provided that the note was consideration
for sellers entering into the agreement; if the sale were completed, the
$15,000 would be credited on the price; if the sellers defaulted, the note
or money paid on it would be returned to the buyers; and if the buyers
defaulted, the note and money paid on it would be retained by the
sellers as consideration for entering into the agreement. The buyers
willfully breached after paying the $15,000, but were entitled to get the
money back, less any damages suffered by the seller. The sellers ar-
gued that the note and its payment were consideration for entering the
agreement and the buyers had received that for which they had bar-
gained. The court, in rejecting this argument, made some important
points which seem equally applicable to a lease bonus or consideration
for execution.
1. Entering into an agreement is meaningless except as rights and
obligations flow from the agreement. You must look to those rights
and obligations to determine whether an initial payment is supported
by separate consideration.
2. The payment cannot be treated like a true option payment be-
cause the buyers did not secure an option to purchase or not as they
pleased, but rather entered into a mutually binding contract and made
the payment in part performance of the contract.
3. The mere recitation that the payment was a consideration for
executing the contract was insufficient to establish execution as mean-
ingful separate consideration.
4. Even if the parties meant what they said in a recitation of consid-
eration for execution, meaningful separate consideration is not estab-
lished. The sellers executed the agreement in consideration of the
buyers' agreement to purchase on all of the terms stated, not in ex-
change for the payment alone.
The court in Caplan said that since it was only because of the buyers'
default that the sellers were given the right to keep the payment, the
provision was void under Civil Code section 1670 as an attempt to fix
the amount of damage or compensation for breach in anticipation
thereof. This indicates that perhaps the sellers' only mistake was in
tying the retention to the buyers' breach, rather than using absolute and
51. Id. at 160, 338 P.2d at 910-11.
52. 56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321, 15 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1961).
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unconditional language of retention unrelated to breach. However, the
court's reasoning mentioned above demonstrates a broader basis for
the decision--execution of the agreement, absent a true option, is not
separate meaningful consideration for the payment.
Suppose the owner of property is considering renting it for twelve
months and he and the prospective Tenant consider the aggregate
rental value for the twelve months to be $12,000. They can set it up in
a number of ways, for example: (1) $1,000 per month rent; (2) a bonus
or consideration for execution of $11,988, and rent of $1 per month; or
(3) a bonus or consideration for execution of $2,000, rent of $1,000 per
month for the first eight months and $500 per month rent for the last
four months. While there can be numerous variations, the economic
substance of the transactions is the same, except for the value to the
Lessor of the use of the Tenant's money in the case of advance pay-
ments. However, calling the payment a bonus or consideration for exe-
cution does not make it any less in substance a payment for future time
segments of use. This is not to imply that each month must be given
the same value or that only the later months should be higher to reflect
inflation or increased market value. The rent for some months during
the term might be higher or lower to reflect legitimate differences in
values of the months, for example in a seasonal recreation location or
in a seasonal business such as a greeting card store.
The recurring talk (and some recent action) of rent control, either as
a Tenant relief device or as part of overall price-wage stabilization,
puts an interesting focus on the bonus or consideration for execution.
If it is truly "rent" that is controlled and the fixed rate for a certain unit
is $100 per month, but the owner thinks it is worth $150 per month, he
could give a one-year lease at $100 per month rent with a bonus or
consideration for execution of $600. However, it is not likely that this
would slip through the fence of rent constraints because in substance
they seek to control the consideration received for time segments of use.
In substance, the $600 as well as the $100 per month, regardless of their
labels, are consideration for these time segments.
The maxim of jurisprudence, that the law respects form less than
substance, recognized in Civil Code section 3528, 5 should be given ef-
fect. Unless the California policy against penalties and forfeitures is
changed, an advance payment of rent, bonus and consideration for exe-
cution should be removed from their protected status. If they represent
payment for something not received, they should be subject to refund
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3528 (West 1970).
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in excess of damages and amounts due to the Lessor. An advance pay-
ment of rent for time segments following termination and vacation by a
Tenant is unearned and should be refunded. A bonus or consideration
which is labeled "for execution of the lease," but which is in substance
additional consideration for the time segments of the lease term, should
be prorated over the initial term of the lease. When the lease is prema-
turely terminated, the portion attributable to the time segments follow-
ing termination and vacation by the Tenant should be refunded.
B. Statutory Provisions
The legislature has enacted three statutes dealing with the refund of
front end payments: the original Civil Code section 1950.5, 54 operative
January 1, 1971; the revised Civil Code section 1950.5, applicable to
residential tenancies, operative January 1, 1978; and the new Civil
Code section 1950.7, applicable to non-residential tenancies, operative
January 1, 1978. Basically, these statutes require the return of certain
types of front end payments, less certain offsets. The following is an
analysis of revised section 1950.5 and new section 1950.7, and the ways
in which they have altered the prior treatment of front end payments.
1. Type of Tenancy
a. Residential
Revised Civil Code section 1950.5 applies to rental agreements for
residential property used as the dwelling of the Tenant. Note that this
coverage is in terms of the type of tenancy use, not just the type of
property. For example, suppose the owner of an apartment building
master leased the entire building to an operator/master Tenant and the
operator/master Tenant then rented the individual apartments to Te-
nants for occupancy. The master lease would not be subject to this
statute even though the property itself is residential. However, the
rental agreements between the master Tenant and the occupant Te-
nants would be subject to it.
The word "dwelling" contained in this statute is given further defini-
tion in Civil Code section 1940,11 operative January 1, 1977. A dwell-
ing unit means "a structure or the part of a structure that is used as a
54. Note that this statute was originally misnumbered "1951," so some of the early com-
mentaries and cases concerning it refer to the wrong number. The real "1951" is the intro-
ductory section to the Lessor remedies legislation operative July 1, 1971.
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940 (West Supp. 1978).
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home, residence, or sleeping place by one person who maintains a
household or by two or more persons who maintain a common house-
hold." Persons who hire dwelling units include "tenants, lessees,
boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated." However, per-
sons occupying hotels, motels, and certain similar facilities, with char-
acteristics mentioned in section 1940(b) are not included.
b. Non-residential
New section 1950.7 applies to a rental agreement for other than resi-
dential property. The language of this statute standing alone might be
misinterpreted because it seems to refer just to the type of property.
However, since this statute was part of the same legislation that revised
section 1950.5, it appears that the definition of "other than residential
property" should be construed in concert with the definition of "resi-
dential property" in section 1950.5, ie., used as the dwelling of the
Tenant. Thus, in the example above where an owner/master Lessor
leased an apartment building to an operator/master Tenant, who then
rented individual units to Tenants for occupancy, although the prop-




The key dates for application of the statute vary depending upon the
portion of the statute involved.56 The provisions of the revised statute
which are the same as the original Civil Code section 1950.5 apply to
payments of deposits made on or after January 1, 1971. The new provi-
sions requiring an accounting by the Lessor within two weeks after the
Tenant vacates apply where the termination occurs on or after January
1, 1978. The other new provisons apply to tenancies, leases, or rental
agreements created or renewed on or after January 1, 1978. The discus-
sion of the residential provisions below will indicate the particular con-
trolling date.
b. Non-residential
The new statute, which states that it declares existing law, applies to
tenancies, leases, or rental agreements created or renewed on or after
January 1, 197 1.1 Since 1971, there has been some confusion in prac-
56. Id. § 1950.5(k).
57. Id. § 1950.7(g).
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tice over whether the original section 1950.5 applied to non-residential
as well as residential tenancies. The new statute, in effect, says that the
original section 1950.5 applied to both non-residential and residential
tenancies.
3. Types of Front End Payments Covered
a. Residential
The statute applies to "security for a rental agreement" which is de-
fined as "any payment, fee, deposit or charge, including, but not lim-
ited to, an advancepayment ofrent, used or to be used, for any purpose,
including, but not limited to, any of the following:" (1) rent default; (2)
repair of Tenant caused damage; and (3) clean-up upon termination.58
The original section 1950.5 included a payment or deposit "the pri-
mary function of which is to secure the performance of a rental agree-
ment." It excluded a "payment or deposit, including an advance
payment of rent, made to secure the execution of a rental agreement."
Although a security deposit was clearly covered, this rather slippery
language left the Lessor room to argue that an advance payment of
rent, bonus or consideration for execution was not covered.
The revised statute eliminates the distinction between a payment to
secure performance and one to secure execution. It covers any pay-
ment, fee, deposit, or charge. It expressly-includes an advance payment
of rent. It covers a payment for any purpose, although the non-exclu-
sive examples in the section seem typical of a security deposit. It seems
to get rid of the distinctions based on labels such as advance payment
of rent, bonus or consideration for execution which have allowed Les-
sors to retain payments without regard to whether Tenants have in fact
received something in return. In effect, the statute is saying that re-
gardless of what you call it, the payment is to be refunded to the extent
it exceeds certain amounts due and certain damages. Thus, the statute
should be considered to cover a security deposit, an advance payment
of rent, and a bonus or consideration for execution of the lease.
Despite the broad language of coverage in the statute, there are some
payments, fees, or charges which should not be subject to the refund
provisions. Although the statute mentions a payment for "any pur-
pose," the non-exclusive examples (rent default, repair of tenant caused
damages, and clean-up upon termination) have a common characteris-
tic--the payment is for something in the future not yet earned by the
58. Id. § 1950.5(a), (b) (emphasis added).
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Lessor, or a damage not yet sustained by him. Even though these ex-
amples are not exclusive, they should be used for guidance in determin-
ing the basic characteristics of the purpose of payments covered by the
statute. The broad language in the statute is like a "one size fits all
garment"-a good idea in theory, but not that flexible in practice. If
there is a payment, fee, or charge that is for something actually pro-
vided by the Lessor, or for a cost actually incurred by him, at the begin-
ning of the term, the refund concept of the statute should not apply.
For example, at the request of the Tenant, the Lessor redecorates in
special colors, cuts a doggie door in the wall, and removes and replaces
doors and windows to accommodate a move-in of special furniture of
the Tenant. Another example is a charge to pay for a credit check. A
more difficult example is a preparation charge. After one Tenant
moves out and before another moves in, there are generally two catego-
ries of work involved on the premises. The first covers damages and
lack of cleaning beyond ordinary wear and tear. These are items for
which the vacating Tenant can be held responsible. The second cate-
gory covers work which, although not necessary to make the unit habit-
able, spruces the place up and makes it a more pleasant place for the
new occupant. Examples are having the walls touched-up or repainted,
or having the carpets shampooed and drapes cleaned to enhance their
appearance. A separate charge for the cost of this work, done to make
the dwelling look more pleasant in appearance for the new Tenant,
should not be covered by the refund provisions of section 1950.5, par-
ticularly if the new Tenant has been given the choice of having the
work done or not.
A true option payment, discussed above in section III. A.4., should
not be considered as included in the statute. The option is really in-
dependent of the bilateral relations of the tenancy itself and the Tenant
has received what he paid for. It is not in any sense security for a rental
agreement, even under the broad definition of the statute.
A front end payment for "liquidated damages" involves special stat-
utory and judicial requirements discussed below. If the agreement for
liquidating damages does not meet the requirements, the payment is in
essence a security deposit and should be covered by section 1950.5. If
the agreement does meet the requirements for liquidating damages, but
the breach for which the damages are liquidated does not occur, the
payment is a security deposit for damages not sustained and it should
also be covered by section 1950.5. However, if the agreement meets the
liquidated damage requirements and the breach that is liquidated oc-
curs, the payment should be governed by the specific law applicable to
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
liquidated damages and should not be deemed covered by section
1950.5. As will be seen in the later discussion on liquidated damages,
the latter situation is not likely to occur in practice with residential ten-
ancies. One who bets on the enforceability of liquidated damages in a
residential tenancy is fond of longshots.
The effective date for subjecting a front end payment to section
1950.5 is a bit of a problem. To the extent that a payment was covered
by the original section, the revised statute applies to a payment made
on or after January 1, 1971. To the extent the payment was not covered
by the original statute, but is covered by the revised one, the statute
applies to tenancies, leases, or rental agreements created or renewed on
or after January 1, 1978.11 A security deposit was covered by the origi-
nal statute, so the January 1, 1971 date applies. But, although the re-
vised statute clearly covers an advance payment of rent and appears to
cover a bonus or consideration for execution, there is some confusion
over whether they were covered by the original statute. Thus, it is un-
clear whether the 1971 or 1978 date applies. The original statute in-
cluded payments to secure performance and excluded payments to
secure execution. Since this distinction is carried forward in the statute
on non-residential tenancies, and discussed immediately below, it will
not be repeated here.
b. Non-residential
Section 1950.7 and its mandatory refund requirement apply to any
payment or deposit "the primary function of which is to secure the per-
formance of a rental agreement. . . or any part of such an agreement,
other than a payment or deposit, including an advance payment of
rent, made to secure the execution of a rental agreement .... ,60 If
the payment or deposit is made to securepeformance, it is covered by
the statute. If the payment or deposit, including an advance payment
of rent, is made to secure execution, it is excluded from coverage.
Clearly, a security deposit type front end payment is covered by the
statute. But what about an advance payment of rent, or bonus or con-
sideration for "execution"? The language in the statute is the same as
the original section 1950.5. A study concerning liquidated damages
prepared for the California Law Revision Commission commented on
the coverage of the original section 1950.5. The article states, "The leg-
islature attempted to reverse cases that permitted the landlord to retain
59. Id. § 1950.5(k).
60. Id. § 1950.7(a).
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advance payments under the labels of prepaid rent or bonus for enter-
ing into the lease ... ,." Hopefully, this is what the legislature did.
Unfortunately, however, the language used in the original section
1950.5 and repeated seven years later in the new legislation, is confus-
ing. Unlike scotch, it did not improve with age. In addition to the
problem of the confusing language, it is unclear why the legislature
used broader language when it revised section 1950.5 with respect to
residential tenancies, but retained the original language when it
adopted section 1950.7 with respect to non-residential tenancies. If the
original language had already eliminated the distinctions between a se-
curity deposit, an advance payment of rent, and a bonus or considera-
tion for "execution," it seems the language in the residential and non-
residential statutes could have remained the same.
The payments or deposits excluded from coverage are those made to
secure the execution of a rental agreement. It seems that the only front
end payment which clearly fits within that phrase is an option payment
given to the Lessor in exchange for an option that binds the Lessor to
execute a rental agreement. This payment secures the execution of a
rental agreement. On the other hand, a bonus or consideration for "ex-
ecution" given at the time of entering a rental agreement, with its bilat-
eral relationships, does not in substance "secure the execution" of the
rental agreement. As discussed above in section III. A.5., the execution
itself is not meaningful separate consideration in this situation.
The incorporation of the language "an advance payment of rent" in
the statutory language which excludes a payment or deposit to secure
execution from the scope of the statute is troublesome. It seems to say
that an advance payment of rent is not covered by the statute, but is so
excluded only if it is paid to secure the execution of the rental agree-
ment. In substance, an advance payment of rent is a payment for a
future time segment of use, not a payment to secure execution. Perhaps
the language refers to a situation where an option payment is made to
secure the execution of a rental agreement and a portion of that pay-
ment is to be applied to rent upon exercise of the option.
The advance payment of rent, bonus and consideration for "execu-
tion," to the extent that they represent payment for something not yet
received, should be subject to refund in excess of damages and amounts
due to the Lessor. This was discussed above in section III4.A 5.
Regarding the difference in language in the residential statute, even
though there are many situations where there is a viable argument that
61. Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 84, 104 (1972).
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a residential Tenant should receive greater protection than a non-resi-
dential Tenant, this is not such a situation. The retention of a front end
payment in excess of the amount of compensation to which a Lessor is
entitled is a penalty or forfeiture, regardless of the residential or non-
residential character of the tenancy. Although it can be argued that the
non-residential statute already covers the typical advance payment of
rent, bonus or consideration, it should be clarified to avoid unnecessary
litigation. The non-residential tenancy has already been the source of
the vast majority of appellate litigation over the labeling of front end
payments, and the statute should put an end to the matter instead of
perpetuating it.
The last type of front end payment, one for liquidated damages, is in
essence a security deposit held to secure the Tenant's performance. If
the agreement for liquidated damages does not meet the special statu-
tory and judicial requirements for validity, the payment should be
treated as any other security deposit covered by section 1950.7. If the
agreement does meet the liquidation requirements, but the breach for
which the damages are liquidated does not occur, the payment should
be treated as a security deposit for damages not sustained and should
be subject to the refund provisions of the statute. If the agreement
meets the liquidation requirements and the liquidated breach does oc-
cur, the payment should be governed by the specific law applicable to
liquidated damages, rather than section 1950.7.
4. Maximum Amount
a. Residential
There is a ceiling on the amount which the Lessor can demand or
receive as a front end payment over and above the first month's rent.62
The limits are: an amount equal to two months' rent for unfurnished
premises; and an amount equal to three months' rent for furnished
premises. The rent for the first month can be collected in addition to
these amounts.
There is a peculiar exception. It states that the ceiling provision
"shall not be construed to prohibit an advance payment of not less than
six months' rent where the term of the lease is six months or longer.
'63
If you think this is a misprint, you are wrong. The exception seems to
say that in a lease of six months or longer, the Lessor -can get an
amount equal to six months' rent or more, but he is in trouble if he
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5(c) (West Supp. 1978).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
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collects less, for example, only five months' rent. This interpretation of
a minimum payment would be inconsistent with the payment limiting
function of the statute. The exception would have made more sense if
it had said "not more than" six months' rent. Perhaps it means that if
the lease is six months or longer, the Lessor can collect advance rent for
the seventh month and beyond without restriction, but the first six
months are subject to the statutory limits. This exception should be
clarified.
The statute contains another exception for fees or charges for certain
alterations made at the request of the Tenant. This exception makes
sense.
The amount limitations are new, so the applicable date is January 1,
1978.
b. Non-residential
There is no statutory limit on the amount of front end payments
which can be collected by a Lessor of non-residential property.
5. Amounts Lessor Can Claim from Deposit
The provisions for Lessor claims against the amount covered by the
statutes for residential and non-residential tenancies are substantially
the same,' so they will be dealt with together with any distinctions
noted.
The Lessor can claim only amounts reasonably necessary to remedy
rent defaults, to repair damages caused by the Tenant, and to clean the
premises upon termination.
The use of the word "only" in limiting the claim to the three catego-
ries mentioned is unfortunate. There can be legitimate claims of a Les-
sor against a Tenant for items which do not fit neatly into those three
categories. Giving a broad construction to the word "rent" and includ-
ing delinquent charges equivalent to rent will help.65 For example, in a
lease which requires the Tenant to pay real property taxes and to pro-
vide insurance coverage, the payment of taxes and premiums should be
considered rent in the broad sense. Even though the payment is not
made directly to the Lessor, it is a payment on his behalf in lieu of the
Lessor's collecting more money directly from the Tenant and then pay-
ing the tax collector and insurance company. However, an expansive
construction of the word "rent" cannot conveniently be applied in all
64. Id. §§ 1950.5(e), 1950.7(c).
65. See, eg., id. § 1951(a).
1978]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
situations in which the Lessor has a legitimate claim. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that the Tenant breaches an express clause requiring him to
make repairs of damage to the.premises even if he did not cause the
damage, or suppose that the Tenant of a commercial lease breaches a
non-competition clause. Unless the word "rent" is stretched to cover
any duty the Tenant owes to the Lessor, the Lessor cannot use the
amount on hand for damages suffered by reason of such breaches. This
will particularly cause problems with non-residential leases which typi-
cally have broad Tenant obligations. At least the statute covering non-
residential leases should be clarified to include claims for damages sus-
tained by reason of a breach of any of the Tenant's obligations.
Regarding a claim for damages to the premises caused by the Ten-
ant, the residential section excludes "ordinary wear and tear," but the
non-residential section does not mention this exclusion. This is not a
significant difference since the Tenant would generally not be responsi-
ble for ordinary wear and tear anyway. Regarding a claim for cleaning
upon termination, the residential section covers cleaning "if necessary"
but the non-residential section does not say "if necessary." It seems we
can assume that if the cleaning were not necessary, the Lessor could not
collect for it even without those magic words in the statute.
There is a troublesome phrase in the non-residential section which
was not included in the residential section. After saying that the Lessor
can claim only amounts reasonably necessary for the three categories
discussed above, it goes on to say "if the payment or deposit is made
for any or all of those specific purposes." Hopefully, this will not be
construed to mean that the lease itself has to specifically mention the
three categories in order for the Lessor to assert a claim against the
fund. Such a construction would lead to the silly result that a general
recital such as "the payment is to secure performance of the Tenant's
obligations" would be insufficient to allow the Lessor to claim delin-
quent rent from the fund. The word "specific" should mean the spe-
cific categories set forth in the statute, not that those categories must be
specifically set forth in the lease. General language in the lease which
by its nature includes the three categories should be sufficient. This
phrase in the statute is a needless source of petty dispute and should be
eliminated.
Since the language of these provisions is substantially similar to the
original section 1950.5, the effective date of January 1, 1971 should be
applicable.
[Vol. 12
FRONT END PA YMENTS
6. Refund Time Limit and Penalty
Both the residential and non-residential sections require a refund of
the remaining balance within two weeks.66 In a residential tenancy, the
two-week period is measured from when the Tenant vacated the prem-
ises. In a non-residential tenancy, it is measured from when the ten-
ancy is terminated. Using termination to start the time running was a
poor choice. The tenancy might be terminated, but the Tenant could
withhold possession for more than two weeks, and the Lessor would
have to refund the money before he could determine the extent of his
damages. The two weeks should start only when the Tenant vacates.
Both the residential and non-residential sections provide that a "bad
faith" retention of the money, or any portion of it, in violation of the
section may subject the landlord or his transferee to damages not to
exceed $200, in addition to actual damages.67 The residential section
expressly places the "burden of proof as to reasonableness of the
amounts claimed" on the Lessor. The non-residential section is silent as
to this burden.
Since the language of these provisions is substantially similar to the
original section 1950.5, the January 1, 1971 effective date should be
applicable.
There had been some question as to whether the punitive damages of
$200 could be recovered in small claims court. When relatively small
amounts are involved, most Tenants will not go to the trouble and ex-
pense of getting a lawyer for a municipal court action. The residential
section now provides that actual and punitive damages can be recov-
ered in small claims court if they are within the jurisdictional amount.68
The same is probably true in a non-residential situation, although the
non-residential section does not mention small claims court recovery.69
7. Priority of Tenant's Claim
Both the residential and non-residential statutes provide that the
Lessor shall hold the money for the Tenant and that the Tenant's claim
is to be prior to the claim of any creditor of the Lessor.70 This seems to
be a recognition that the Tenant has a continuing substantial interest in
the payment or deposit. The non-residential section excepts a trustee in
bankruptcy from the Tenant's priority.
66. Id. §§ 1950.5(e), 1950.7(c).
67. Id. §§ 1950.5(h), 1950.7(f).
68. Id. § 1950.50). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.2 (West Supp. 1978).
69. 59 Op. Aarr'y GEN. 321 (1976).
70. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1950.5(d), 1950.7(b) (West Supp. 1978).
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These provisions are the same as the original Civil Code section
1950.5, except that the original statute applied the exception of a trustee
in bankruptcy also to a residential lease. Thus, for most purposes, the
January 1, 1971 effective date will be applicable.
8. Accounting
a. Residential
A form of accounting by the Lessor is required in three different situ-
ations:
1. An "itemized written statement of the basis for, and the amount
of, any security received and the disposition of such security" must be
given within two weeks after the Tenant vacates.
71
2. The same type of a statement is required within a reasonable
time if the Lessor returns the unused balance of the money upon a
termination of the Lessor's interest in the property.72
3. A notice of "claims made against the security" is required,
within a reasonable time, if the Lessor transfers the unused balance of
the security to his successor upon termination of the Lessor's interest in
the property.73
The applicable effective date in the first situation is a termination on
or after January 1, 1978. The applicable date in the second and third
situations is a creation or renewal on or after January 1, 1978. If a
Lessor's interest in a pre-1978 lease is terminated, even though the stat-
ute technically does not require an accounting, it would seem to be fair
and good practice to give one anyway.
b. Non-residential
The only situation in which any type of an accounting is required in
a non-residential tenancy is where a Lessor transfers the unused bal-
ance of a front end payment to his successor upon termination of the
Lessor's interest in the property.74 A notice of "claims made against
the payment or deposit" must be given to the Tenant.
When the lease terminates or when the Lessor returns the unused
balance upon termination of the Lessor's interest in the property, even
though the statute does not require an accounting, it would seem to be
fair and good practice to give one anyway.
71. Id. § 1950.5(e).
72. Id. § 1950.5()(2).
73. Id. § 1950.5(f)(1).
74. Id. § 1950.7(d)(1).
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9. Relief from Liability when Lessor Transfers
The provisions applicable to residential and non-residential tenan-
cies are substantially similar. When a Lessor's interest is terminated by
sale, assignment, death, appointment of a receiver, or otherwise, the
Lessor (or his estate) can be relieved of further liability for front end
payments by following one of two simple alternatives, within a reason-
able time.7
First, the Lessor or his agent can transfer the unused balance to the
successor and notify the Tenant. The transferee takes on all of the
rights and obligations of a landlord with respect to the security, pay-
ment, or deposit.76 The statute should be construed in a manner that
limits the transferee's obligation to the amount received from the Les-
sor, since the transferee is in a poor position to evaluate the legitimacy
of deductions by the transferor. In the case of a sale, it should not
make any difference whether the transfer is made by an actual transfer
of funds or a credit against the sale price. The economic effect is the
same.
The notice to the Tenant of such a transfer must be given by personal
delivery or certified mail and must specify claims made against the
fund and give the transferee's name and address. In the case of a resi-
dential tenancy, it must also give the transferee's telephone number. If
the notice is given by personal delivery, the statute says the Tenant
"shall" acknowledge receipt and sign the Lessor's copy. Although it is
certainly good practice to obtain this type of proof of service, some
Tenants will refuse to sign for various reasons. One reason might be a
mistaken belief that signing the receipt would be an admission of the
correctness of the Lessor's figure for the balance remaining. Although
most Tenants know that signing a traffic ticket does not admit guilt,
many will be leery of signing a Lessor's form. If the Tenant does refuse
to sign, it would be a good idea to have the server sign a declaration to
that effect on the Lessor's copy.
Under the second alternative, the Lessor can return the unused bal-
ance to the Tenant to be relieved of further liability, but it is unlikely
that the bird in hand will be given up in many cases. In the case of a
residential tenancy, the Lessor must also give the Tenant an accounting
with the refund. Even though the statute does not require an account-
ing for a non-residential tenancy, it would seem to be fair and good
practice for the Lessor to give one anyway.
75. Id. §§ 1950.5(f), 1950.7(d).
76. Id. §§ 1950.5(g), 1950.7(e).
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Since these provisions are substantially similar to the original Civil
Code section 1950.5, January 1, 1971 is the applicable effective date.
Compliance with the requirements of the statute gives the Lessor a
very important benefit not otherwise available. The obligation of a
Lessor with respect to a deposit has been considered a personal one,
putting the Lessor in a position of a debtor to the Tenant. The obliga-
tion of the Lessor continues despite a transfer of his interest to a succes-
sor.77 Even though the transferring Lessor might get reimbursement
from the transferee,7 and even though the Tenant might choose to go
after the transferee,79 it is much better for the Lessor to get off the hook
completely and to avoid future surprises. Also, it makes more practical
sense to have the successor, the new Lessor, with the control over and
responsibility for the money because he will have the continuing rela-
tionship with the Tenant.
10. Waiver by Tenant
a. Residential
There are two statutes that expressly prohibit a waiver of the Ten-
ant's entitlement to a refund when the tenancy is residential. Revised
section 1950.5 applies to a tenancy, lease, or rental agreement created
or renewed on or after January 1, 1978.80 Civil Code section 1953 ap-
plies to leases and rental agreements executed on or after January 1,
1976.8'
If the tenancy relationship was created prior to January, 1976, the
validity of a waiver agreement is still in question. However, it seems
that a valid waiver is unlikely. The original section 1950.5 did not ex-
pressly cover the question of waiver. In Bauman v. Islay Investments,82
the court was not very impressed with arguments that the statute's fail-
ure to expressly say "non-waivable" indicated permission to waive.
However, the court did not find it necessary to determine whether a
Tenant's entitlement to a refund under the statute was waivable. The
court concluded that even if waivable, there was not a sufficient waiver
present in the facts.
77. Federated Mortgage Inv. v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 47 Cal. App. 3d 917, 121
Cal. Rptr. 137 (1975); Gallagher v. McMann, 119 Cal. App. 688, 7 P.2d 204 (1932); Waiter
H. Sullivan, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 Cal. App. 591, 3 P.2d 72 (1931).
78. Walter H. Sullivan, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 Cal. App. 591, 3 P.2d 72 (1931).
79. Thompson v. Swiryn, 95 Cal. App. 2d 619, 213 P.2d 740 (1950).
80. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1950.5(i), (k) (West Supp. 1978).
81. Id. § 1953(a)(1), (c).
82. 30 Cal. App. 3d 752, 106 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1973).
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The rental agreement in Bauman stated in capital letters: " THIS IS
YOUR NON-REFUNDABLE CLEANING FEE RECEIPT." It also
stated, "The cleaning fee is payable in full, in advance, prior to occu-
pancy and is NON-REFUNDABLE." Do you get the feeling from this
language that the Tenant should not expect to get the money back?
Not so. Regarding whether the payment by the Tenant was made to
"secure performance," the court pointed out that the "house rules" in-
cluded in the agreement provided that the Tenant was taking posses-
sion of the unit in good condition and would diligently maintain it.
The court concluded that the cleaning fee had no possible purpose
other than protection of the Lessor against costs of restoring a unit not
maintained. Regarding the requirements for a valid waiver, the court
said the language in the rental agreement was clear and prominently
printed, so the Tenant could not honestly claim ignorance of its pres-
ence. However, the court said that a waiver of a statutory right could
not be effective unless it appeared that the waiving party had been fully
informed of the existence of that right, its meaning, and the effect of the
waiver, and that he fully understood the explanation.
Even if the Tenant's rights under the original section 1950.5 were
waivable in a pre-1976 agreement, looking for a waiver that meets the
Bauman requirements in a pre-1976 residential agreement is like riding
an escalator backwards-not a very moving experience.
If one believes that people occasionally submit to temptation, there is
another problem to consider. Some Lessors feel that even though a
waiver is void, on the average only a few Tenants will bother fighting
for a refund. Some Lessors will succumb to the temptation to play the
percentages and include a waiver in the lease and then just refund
when pressed. Even the prospect of an occasional $200 penalty for bad
faith might not be a sufficient deterrent to such a practice. Where the
Lessor has followed this practice, a class action might be an appropri-
ate means of reinforcing rectitude. In a second Bauman case,8 3 al-
though the plaintiff had failed to adequately establish the requirements
for a class action, the court expressed optimism about qualifying this
type of a situation for a class action, and pointed out that a primary
and salutary purpose of a class action is to redress small wrongs that
might otherwise go unredressed.
b. Non-residential
There is no express provision prohibiting a waiver in a non-residen-
83. Bauman v. Islay lnvs., 45 Cal. App. 3d 797, 119 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
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tial tenancy. The language in Civil Code section 1950.7 is substantially
the same as the original section 1950.5. Thus, the issue raised, but not
resolved in the first Bauman case, discussed above, is still present.
Does the absence of a prohibition indicate that a waiver is permitted?
It might be argued that since revised section 1950.5 (residential) con-
tains an express prohibition and section 1950.7 (non-residential) does
not, the omission is an expression of waivability. In the first Bauman
case, a similar argument was made that Civil Code section 1942.1, en-
acted in the same legislative session as the original section 1950.5, ex-
pressly prohibited waiver of a Tenant's habitability protections, thus if
the legislature intended refund protections to be non-waivable, similar
language would have been included in section 1950.5. The court was
not persuaded. However, the argument may be more persuasive in
comparing the revised section 1950.5 and section 1950.7. These two
sections were not only enacted in the same session, they were part of
the same piece of legislation, dealing with the same topic of front end
payments, and there is an intentional pattern of broader protection for
a residential Tenant.
However, though it might be effectively argued that the omission
from the non-residential statute was intentional and that the statute it-
self was not designed to prevent a waiver of a refund, it seems that a
waiver should still be void. The statute covers a payment or deposit to
secure the Tenant's performance. A refund is at issue only when the
payment or deposit exceeds the amount reasonably necessary to com-
pensate the Lessor for failure of performance. To the extent that the
payment or deposit exceeds compensation to the Lessor, its retention,
by way of waiver or otherwise, is a forfeiture or penalty. A forfeiture
or penalty is prohibited independently of section 1950.7.
C. Transfer of Lessor's or Tenant's Interest in the Property
The receipt of a refundable payment or deposit creates a personal
obligation of the Lessor recipient to the Tenant that is not automati-
cally extinguished when the Lessor transfers his interest in the property
to a successor. However, there is a statutory procedure, discussed in
section III.B.9. above, which allows the Lessor to relieve himself from
future liability by transferring the fund to the successor or returning it
to the Tenant. If the statutory procedure is not complied with or the
front end payment is not covered by the statute, the transferring Lessor
seeking protection will have to try to get a release from the Tenant, or
an indemnity from the transferee.
The original Tenant who enters into the lease or rental agreement
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and pays the refundable payment or deposit is entitled to recover it.
This is recognized by language in both the residential and non-residen-
tial tenancy statutes which states that the Lessor shall hold the money
"for the tenant who is party" to the lease or rental agreement.14 Al-
though a Tenant can assign his rights to a successor, a mere assignment
of the leasehold estate, without an assignment of rights to the payment
or deposit, will not shift the right to recover.85 This is a matter which
should be given express attention in drafting lease assignments in order
to avoid later disputes between assignor and assignee.86 Not only
should the assignment price and prorations (e.g., taxes, insurance,
rents, utilities) be clear, but also the handling of the front end payment
should be spelled out. In addition, the Lessor should determine
whether or not the entitlement to refund has been assigned or retained
so that the proper party can be paid if and when a refund comes due.
IV. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
A. Nature
The parties to a lease or rental agreement sometimes agree that in the
event a particular breach occurs, a certain amount will be the agreed
damages or compensation to the Lessor for such breach. Alternatively,
the parties might provide for a formula to calculate the amount of dam-
ages or compensation. In effect, the provision says that even though
there has been no breach yet and the parties do not know what the
exact actual damages will be when it occurs, if the breach does occur,
the Lessor will be entitled to a specific amount or specifically determi-
nable amount, no more and no less.
Usually the liquidated damage provision is tied in with a front end
payment, which in substance is a security deposit for the liquidated
damages if the breach occurs.
There are both advantages and dangers of liquidated damages to
keep in mind while evaluating liquidation requirements.87 A provision
for liquidated damages may avoid the cost, difficulty, and delay of
proving damages, and, in certain cases, may avoid problems in proving
84. CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 1950.5(d), 1950.7(b) (West Supp. 1978).
85. Reidy v. Miller, 85 Cal. App. 764, 767, 260 P. 361, 362 (1927).
86. See, e.g., Monogram Indus., Inc. v. Statewide Theatre Circuit, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d
868, 42 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1965) (under an agreement to assign remainder of leasehold, seller
not entitled to credit from buyer for $10,000 paid to Lessor earlier under lease reducing final
year's rent by $10,000.
87. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT, 13 CALIFORNIA LAW
REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 1601, 1740-41 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 AoNuAL REPORT].
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causation and foreseeability, or problems with proving certain types of
damages. It allows a party to put a known ceiling on his potential lia-
bility for his breach. Also, it may aid judicial administration by elimi-
nating or shortening some litigation. On the other hand, there is a
danger that liquidation may be used oppressively -and unfairly when
one party has the power to dictate the terms of the agreement, or when
one party does not understand the effect of the provision.
B Pre-Tuly 1, 1978 Clauses
The development of liquidated damage requirements, prior to the
recent legislation covered below, is mentioned briefly in section IIIA.2.
above, and is given thorough treatment in an excellent study prepared
by Justin Sweet for the California Law Revision Commission. 8 Thus,
the requirements for pre-July 1, 1978 clauses will just be briefly sum-
marized here as a background to the recent legislation. The most prac-
tical way of looking at the requirements is in terms of what must be
done in litigation concerning a liquidated damage clause, as was dis-
cussed in the United Savings & Loan Association v. Reeder. 9
The proponent of the liquidated damage clause has the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following founda-
tional facts:
1. There must be an agreement fixing an amount to be considered as
liquidated damagesfor breach. It seems apparent from the nature and
function of liquidated damages that the purpose of the requirement of
fixing damages is to prevent a clause that gives the damaged party a
choice between the liquidated damages and actual damages. Such a
choice would be contrary to the settlement nature and function of liqui-
dating damages. The clause should provide for the sole money remedy
for a particular breach. However, just because you cannot have your
cake and eat it too, does not mean that you cannot use a cupcake ap-
proach and liquidate just certain kinds of breaches and damages, while
leaving different kinds ofbreaches and damages subject to proof of
actual damages. In fact, when you consider the second foundational
fact, this cupcake approach seems advisable.
2. It would be impracticable or extremely dffcult to fix the amount of
actual damages. It is the time when the contract is entered, rather
than the time of breach, that impracticability or extreme difficulty must
exist. It is possible to have a situation where it is impracticable, but not
88. Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84 (1972). See also 1976
ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 87, at 1739-64.
89. 57 Cal. App. 3d 282, 129 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1976).
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extremely difficult, to fix actual damages. For example, such a situa-
tion exists when the amount of actual damages is small, but the cost of
ascertaining the damages would exceed the damages. 90
3. The agreed amount must be the result of a reasonable endeavor by
both parties to determine an amount that bears a reasonable relationsho
to actual damages. Combining the second and third requirements
seems like saying it has to be tough to determine actual damages, but
you have to come close.
If the proponent establishes the three foundational facts, there is a
presumed fact that the liquidated damage amount represents the actual
damages suffered by reason of the breach.
The opponent of the clause may introduce evidence to negate the
foundational facts, or the presumed fact, or both. Thus, even if the
proponent establishes all of the foundational facts, the opponent can
still attack the amount of liquidated damages as unreasonably in excess
of actual damages.
The drafter and proponent of a liquidated damage clause in Califor-
nia has been like a salmon swimming upstream to mate-very few
make it, and it might not be worth the trip when you get there. As
pointed out in section III!.2. above, most of the cases dealing with
liquidated damages clauses in leases have knocked them out, usually
on the basis that the actual damages were not impracticable or ex-
tremely difficult to ascertain.
C. Post-July 1, 1978 Clauses
The legislature, as part of a comprehensive revision of the law relat-
ing to liquidated damages, repealed Civil Code section 1670 and
amended section 1671, operative July 1, 1978. The general approach
was to leave "consumer" type contracts subject to the stiff constraints
originally imposed on liquidating damages, but to allow liquidation on
a more liberal basis for "non-consumer" type contracts.
A residential lease (for use as a dwelling by the party or those depen-
dent upon the party for support) comes within the "consumer" category
and will remain subject to the strict requirements discussed above in
connection with the pre-July 1, 1978 clauses.91
A non-residential lease provision liquidating damages, however, "is
valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes
90. Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197; 108 Cal.
Rptr. 845 (1973).
91. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1671(c)(2), (d) (West Supp. 1978).
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that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at
the time the contract was made."92 Note how the emphasis shifts from
"void except" in a residential lease to "valid unless" in a non-residen-
tial lease. The opponent has to establish unreasonableness and must do
so on the basis of the circumstances existing at the time the contract
was made. The report of the California Law Revision Commission
which generated this new legislation states that unreasonableness
should not be judged by hindsight, and to permit consideration of dam-
ages actually suffered would defeat a primary purpose of liquidation,
the avoidance of litigating the amount of actual damages. 93 This liber-
alization for non-residential leases does not mean there is now a license
to fill in the blank with whatever the traffic will bear, but it does give
protection to realistic attempts to liquidate.
Despite the general liberalization of the liquidation requirements,
the lease drafter must give consideration to the specific type of damages
in a non-residential tenancy that would be suitable for liquidation. For
example, are damages based on the rent obligation suitable for liquida-
tion?
The old cases that discouraged liquidation by imposition of the im-
practicable/extremely difficult test were decided within the framework
of Lessor remedies that existed prior to the substantial revision of rem-
edies in Civil Code sections 1951.2 and 1951.4, operative July 1, 1971.
The pre-July, 1971 rent related remedies for a breach or abandonment
were basically the following:94
1. The Lessor could leave the lease in effect and sue for the rent as
it accrued. If the premises had been abandoned by the Tenant, the
Lessor had no obligation to mitigate damages and could leave the
premises vacant.
2. The Lessor could leave the lease in effect and relet the premises
to another Tenant "on behalf of' the breaching Tenant. The deficiency
resulting from collecting less rent on reletting than the rent agreed to by
the breaching Tenant could be collected at the end of the original term.
3. The Lessor could terminate the lease and retake possession on
his own behalf. The Lessor could collect rent that accrued before ter-
mination. However, subject to an exception noted below, the Lessor
could not collect any damages based on post-termination losses in rent.
92. Id. § 1671(b).
93. 1976 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at 1742.
94. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELAT-
ING TO ABANDONMENT OR TERMINATION OF A LEASE, 8 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COM-
MISSION REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STuDIES 702, 707-08, 743-62 (1966).
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For example, suppose the lease had three years to run when terminated
and the lease provided for rent of $1,000 per month. If the Lessor
could only get $900 per month upon relettinig, the loss of $100 per
month for thirty-six months was not recoverable from the breaching
Tenant.
With each of these three remedies, the rent or rent-based damages
would have been subject to relatively easy calculation and proof if a
fixed rent lease was involved. Hence, the damages would not have been
impracticable or extremely difficult to ascertain. Suppose, however,
that the Lessor could terminate the lease and collect post-termination
prospective damages, based on the difference between the agreed rent
and the amount of rent which the Lessor could reasonably produce
from the premises in the future over the balance of the lease term. Sup-
pose also that the terminated lease provided for percentage rent based
on the business generated from the Tenant's use of the premises.
Under these circumstances, the determination of damages would de-
pend upon predicting the future rental value of the premises and pre-
dicting what the productivity of the Tenant's business would have been
in the future if there had been no breach. As the need for clairvoyance
increases, so does the degree of difficulty in determining actual dam-
ages, particularly when several years of the lease remain at the time of
termination.
Although post-termination damages were available prior to July 1,
1971 by special lease provision,95 the adoption of the comprehensive
remedy legislation which became operative on that date has increased
the attention given to prospective damages, and provided for the recov-
ery of such damages even absent a lease clause in certain circum-
stances.96 It seems that these damages, particularly in percentage rent
leases and long. term leases, are suitable for liquidation.
Another example of a situation in which liquidation of rent-related
damages would seem suitable is a Tenant's abandonment of premises
held under a percentage lease. The 1971 legislation provides that, sub-
ject to certain requirements, the Lessor can leave the lease in effect,
leave the premises vacant, and "recover the rent as it becomes due."
9 7
If the Tenant has abandoned and has not made any effort to sublet or
assign to another operator, the Lessor's right to recover rent as it comes
due in the future involves the problem that there is no existing business
upon which percentage rents can be calculated. Liquidating damages
95. CAL. CrV. CODE § 3308 (West Supp. 1978).
96. Id. § 1951.2.
97. Id. § 1951.4.
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flowing from the Tenant's failure to operate would seem appropriate in
such a situation.
The liberalized test for liquidated damages in non-residential leases
and the suitability of a particular class of damages do not assure the
enforceability of a liquidation provision. There must be some reason-
able basis for the specified amount of liquidated damages. For exam-
ple, consider a "one form fits all" type clause that provides: "If Tenant
breaches this lease, Lessor shall be entitled to $10,000 as liquidated
damages, the actual damages being impracticable and extremely diffi-
cult to ascertain." This seems unreasonable on its face. It lumps to-
gether all breaches, regardless of type or severity, it makes no
distinction based on whether the lease is terminated or continued in
effect, and it makes no distinction based on the time remaining at the
time of breach. The only apparent advantages of such a clause are that
it takes little space and even less energy. The drafting of a liquidated
damage clause should take into consideration the type of breach, the
type of damages being liquidated, the type of remedy involved (e.g.,
termination or continuation of the lease), and the duration of the lease
term remaining at the time of breach. It is particularly important to
consider the balance of the term remaining when rent-related damages
are involved. If, for example, the lease has a twenty-year term, a lump
sum of liquidated damages ignores that a breach and termination in the
first year would produce substantially different damages than a breach
and termination in the nineteenth year. The damages could be liqui-
dated by drafting a formula with an agreed factor or factors being mul-
tiplied by the number of months remaining in the term.
A late payment charge is another common example of the problem
of a reasonable basis for the amount of liquidated damages. Recent
California decisions have treated a late payment charge as an attempt
to liquidate damages, subject to liquidation requirements.98 In Garrett
v. Coast & Southern Federal Savings & Loan Association,99 the court
struck down a loan late payment 'charge of two percent of the loan
balance because it was not reasonably calculated as fair compensation
to the lender. The court pointed out dual purposes served by a late
charge: to compensate the lender for administrative expenses and cost
of money withheld; and to "encourage" the borrower to pay on time. If
such a charge is designed to substantially exceed damages, it is an at-
tempt to compel timely payment by the threat of a penalty that lacks a
98. Crestwood Library Co. v. Citizens Say. & Loan Ass'n, 83.Cal. App. 3d 819, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1978).
99. 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
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reasonable relationship to actual losses. Even though liquidated dam-
ages may still be valid when they have the incidental consequence of
encouraging good conduct,100 if there is no reasonable endeavor to de-
termine an amount with a reasonable relationship to the potential ac-
tual damages, the provision is a void penalty. Another important point
made by the Garrett court is the distinction between "extreme diffi-
culty" and "impracticable." Although it was not necessary to deter-
mine the issue, the couri pointed out that even though it may not be
extremely difficult to determine actual damages, it may be impractica-
ble to do so. This is particularly true with late charges, where the ac-
tual damages would be comparatively small, but it would be
economically impracticable to prove actual damages in each instance
of default in timely payment.
Drafters of late payment charges may find some guidance, by anal-
ogy, in the legislation governing late payment charges in loans on sin-
gle-family, owner-occupied dwellings.101 Consider, however, that even
though it is theoretically possible to draft and enforce a late payment
charge on rent, it may not make practical sense for a Lessor to try to
enforce it when possession is sought in an unlawful detainer action.
The preliminary three-day notice to pay rent or quit must set forth the
amount due.'1 2 When a late charge is included in the amount due, is it
worth the potential delay and expense of litigating the validity of liqui-
dated damages? Would the Lessor be better off settling for interest?
Consider, for example, that the trial court might sustain a demurrer to
the unlawful detainer complaint on the basis that the demand in the
preliminary notice was excessive. 10 3 Do not pass go, do not collect
$200.10 4
The format of a liquidated damage clause should be given some con-
sideration. New legislation, concerning liquidated damages in a resi-
dential property purchase contract, requires that the provision be
separately signed or initialed, and, if in a printed form, that it be a
certain size type.10 5 Although the format requirements do not appear
to apply to tenancies, it might be a good drafting technique to follow
100. Lowe v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 718, 127 Cal. Rptr. 23
(1976).
101. CAL. Cwr. CODE § 2954.4 (West Supp. 1978).
102. CAL. Cwr. PROC. CODE § 1161.2 (West Supp. 1978).
103. Kirby v. Mann, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REvinw 685 (San Mateo County Muni. Ct. Nov.
15, 1973).
104. See Monopoly, Parker Bros., Inc., 1936.
105. CAL. Cwr. CODE § 1677 (West Supp. 1978).
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them anyway. They demonstrate a conscious attention to the liquida-
tion of damages.
V. OTHER FACTORS
This article has focused primarily on the refundability of front end
payments, to the extent the payment exceeds the amounts due to, and
damages suffered by, the Lessor. In the structuring of a front end pay-
ment, consideration should also be given to other factors which might
have an impact. A couple of examples of such factors will be dealt with
here.
A. Income Tax Treatment
The treatment of a front end payment, for income tax purposes, will
vary depending on the type of payment involved. In a non-residential
lease, where a substantial payment is more likely to be involved, the
choice of payment type can have a significant impact. There are sev-
eral sources for a detailed discussion of the tax ramifications,10 6 so only
a brief summary is necessary here.
The payment of a refundable security deposit has no immediate tax
consequences. It is neither income to the Lessor, nor a deduction for
the Tenant. If it is later returned to the Tenant, no tax consequences
occur. If it is later applied to a rent default, however, it is income to the
Lessor and a deduction for the Tenant at the time of application.
When the security is applied to breaches other than rent, the tax treat-
ment varies, depending on the type of breach. A provision for applica-
tion of the security deposit to future rent runs the risk of treatment as
an advance payment of rent for tax purposes.
An advance payment of rent is considered as income to the Lessor
upon receipt, regardless of whether the Lessor is on a cash or accrual
method of accounting. However, the Tenant cannot deduct the pay-
ment until the arrival of the period or periods for which the payment
has been designated. If no specific period has been designated, the pay-
ment must be amortized over the lease term by the Tenant.
A bonus or consideration for execution is income to the Lessor upon
receipt, and the deduction available to the Tenant must be amortized
over the lease term.
When a payment is required to be amortized over the lease term by
106. See, a., CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, COMMERCIAL REAL
PROPERTY LEASE PRACTICE §§ 4.32-4.35, 5.10; ANDERSON, TAX FACTORS IN REAL ESTATE
OPERATIONS 284-86 (4th ed. 1976).
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the Tenant, the period of an option to extend or renew must generally
be included, unless certain limited exceptions are present.107
The tax treatment of a security deposit seems to be based on the fact
that the Lessor does not have an unqualified right to keep the payment
since it must be refunded to the extent it exceeds amounts due to, or
damages suffered by, the Lessor. If California is going to disregard the
labels of advance payment of rent, and bonus or consideration for "ex-
ecution," and subject these payments to refund to the extent they are
unearned (reference sections I1,.5. & III.B.3. above), it seems that the
tax treatment accorded to these payments should be reevaluated.
B. Deed of Trust Sale or Foreclosure
A Tenant making a substantial front end payment has reason to be
concerned if the lease will be subordinate to a trust deed. This
subordinate position would occur either where the trust deed encum-
bers the property prior to the lease or where the lease requires the Ten-
ant to subordinate his interest to a subsequent trust deed given by the
Lessor. If the trust deed has priority and there is a trustee's sale or
foreclosure, the lease will be subject to termination0 and the Tenant
will be at the mercy of the buyer at the sale. The Tenant can try to
work out a deal with the buyer, but unless the continued tenancy is
very favorable to the buyer, the Tenant will be in a poor position to
bargain. If the lease is terminated, the Tenant will lose the right to
future possession and the benefit of his front end payment.
Although the Tenant can proceed against the Lessor for breach of
quiet enjoyment by reason of eviction by the paramount interest,1°9 in
many cases the judgment can just be placed in the Tenant's scrapbook
of fond memories. If the Lessor does not have the money to prevent
default on the trust deed note, he will probably be in a poor position to
respond in damages.
When there is an existing trust deed, the Tenant can try to work out
protection with the lender before the lease is executed and the front end
payment made. He can try to get the lender to agree to subordinate the
trust deed to the lease. Another alternative would be to try to get a
"Nondisturbance Agreement" from the lender, with the lender agree-
ing to recognize the Tenant's continued right to possession, and credit
for front end payments made pursuant to the lease. If the lease appears
favorable to the lender, and the lender covets the cash flow generated
107. I.R.C. § 178.
108. McDermott v. Burke, 16 Cal. 580, 589-90 (1860).
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1927 (West 1954).
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from the lease, the Tenant will have some bargaining power with the
lender. Otherwise, the Tenant will come away empty-handed.
When the Tenant is faced with a lease provision requiring subordi-
nation to future trust deeds by the Lessor, the Tenant should think long
and hard about the sweetheart of a deal he is getting into. Perhaps the
Tenant can require a "Nondisturbance Agreement" from the lender as
a condition to subordination. Again, his bargaining power will deter-
mine success in eliminating or qualifying the subordination clause.
Consideration should also be given to placing the front end payment
in a trust or escrow with provision for refund to the Tenant in the event
of a trustee's sale or foreclosure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusion to an article generally seems more modest than its
introduction. The expectations generated at the beginning give way to
the hope at the end that some point has been made in between.
The point here is that there are various ways a front end payment
can be structured, and the choice has important ramifications. The true
nature of the payment, rather than labels, should determine those
ramifications, particularly with regard to refundability upon premature
termination of the tenancy. In negotiating or litigating a front end pay-
ment, there must be a sensitivity to the true nature of the payment, the
background cases, the statutory modifications, and the remaining ques-
tions and ambiguities requiring legislative or judicial attention. Front
end payments in California have been like donuts-some substance
and some plain air. As you wander through front end payments,
whatever be your goal, keep you eye upon the donut and not upon the
hole.
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